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Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy 
 
Abstract 
Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in 
psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to 
estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a 
representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we 
enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of 
each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We 
found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 
70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate 
in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research 
practices going forward.  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last several years, impressive efforts have been made to estimate the reproducibility of 
various empirical literatures. Notable examples include the Open Science Collaboration’s (OSC) 
attempt to estimate the reproducibility of psychological science (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015), the Reproducibility Project’s analogous initiative for cancer biology (Nosek & Errington, 
2017), meta-scientist John Ioannidis’s modeling efforts in biomedicine and beyond (e.g., 
Ioannidis, 2005) and a 2015 estimate produced by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for research in economics (Chang & Li, 2015). Although there is ongoing debate about 
what the optimal replication rate1 should be for a given field in light of trade-offs between, e.g., 
innovation and confirmation (Gilbert, King, Pettigrew, & Wilson, 2016; Makel & Plucker, 
2014), many scientists regard the estimates that have been generated—less than 50% in each of 
the above cases—as worryingly low. For example, a survey of 1,576 scientists conducted by 
Nature revealed that 52% percent thought there was a “significant” reproducibility crisis (Baker, 
                                                          
1 Meaning, the ratio of published studies that would replicate versus not replicate if a high-quality 
replication study were carried out.  
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2016). A smaller percentage, 3%, thought there was no crisis, while 38% thought there was a 
“slight” crisis and 7% were unsure. What is not a matter of controversy, however, is that these 
replication initiatives have generated much-needed discussions among researchers about the state 
of their sciences. Aspects being put under the microscope include the reliability and effectiveness 
of common research designs, statistical strategies, publication practices, and methods of peer 
review (Benjamin et al., 2017; Earp & Wilkinson, 2017; Findley, Jensen, Malesky, & Pepinsky, 
2016; Lakens et al., 2018; Locascio, 2017; Young, Ioannidis, & Al-Ubaydli, 2008). Meanwhile, 
promising ideas for improvement—including the recent push toward norms of pre-registration—
are now gaining traction among leading scientists (Chambers & Munafò, 2013; Munafò et al., 
2017; Nosek et al., 2018; but see Lash & Vandenbroucke, 2012; Scott, 2013).   
One field that has yet to see such an initiative take place is experimental philosophy. As a 
new academic movement that aims to supplement the classic ‘armchair’ approach of 
analytic philosophy with empirical research, experimental philosophy—x-phi for short—uses the 
data-driven methods characteristic of the social sciences to make progress on the sorts of 
questions that have traditionally been studied by philosophers. Traditionally, experimental 
philosophers have focused on the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuitions, 
including factors that shape them and psychological mechanisms that underlie them (Knobe et 
al., 2012; Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Machery, 2017a). However, there have recently been calls to 
go beyond this restrictive conception focused solely on intuitions, to a more inclusive conception 
that is more reflective of the breadth of work in the field (Cova et al., 2012; O’Neill & Machery, 
2014; Rose & Danks 2013). A more comprehensive definition of experimental philosophy, then, 
could be the use of empirical methods to put to test key premises of philosophical arguments. 
These premises need not only involve claims about people’s intuitions, but could also involve 
testable assumptions about people’s attitudes, behaviors, perceptions, emotional responses to 
various stimuli, and so on. Experimental philosophy is thus inherently interdisciplinary and can 
often yield insights about ‘how the mind works’ that may be of interest to other fields (Knobe, 
2007, 2016) 
Insofar as x-phi overlaps with other disciplines that study how the mind works, such as 
cognitive science or social psychology, one might expect that its empirical output should be 
approximately as replicable as research in those other areas. According to the OSC estimate 
11 
 
concerning psychology, there was some variation in reproducibility depending on sub-field. 
Papers published in more ‘cognitive’ journals, such as the Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, reportedly replicated at rates of 48-53%, while papers 
published in the more ‘social’ journals, such as the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, replicated at rates of 23-29% (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Since x-phi 
research explores both ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ questions depending on the nature of the 
philosophical premise being tested, one possible prediction is that its findings should replicate 
somewhere in the middle of those estimated ranges, that is, roughly in the vicinity of 35%.  If so, 
we would have good reasons to doubt the reliability of most results gathered by experimental 
philosophers. How trustworthy, then, is the published literature in our field?  
 
1.1. The need for ‘direct’ replication 
To answer this question, ‘direct’ replications are needed (Doyen, Klein, Simons, & Cleeremans, 
2014). Direct replications—often contrasted with ‘conceptual’ replications—are replications that 
attempt to follow the design and methods of an original study as closely as possible in order to 
confirm its reported findings. Conceptual replications, by contrast, involve making a deliberate 
change to one or more aspects of the original design or methods, often to explore issues 
surrounding generalizability (Crandall & Sherman, 2016; Hendrick, 1990; Schmidt, 2009; for a 
different take on the relation between direct and conceptual replications, however, see Machery, 
2017b). But such ‘replications’ may not be sufficient to identify likely weaknesses or potential 
errors in the published literature (Earp, in press). As Doyen et al. (2014, p. 28) note: 
 
The problem with conceptual replication in the absence of direct replication is that there 
is no such thing as a “conceptual failure to replicate.” A failure to find the same “effect” 
using a different operationalization can be attributed to the differences in method rather 
than to the fragility of the original effect. Only the successful conceptual replications will 
be published, and the unsuccessful ones can be dismissed without challenging the 
underlying foundations of the claim. Consequently, conceptual replication without direct 
replication is unlikely to [provide meaningful evidence about the reliability of the] 
underlying effect. 
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Fortunately, experimental philosophers have not been blind to such issues. Until recently, Joshua 
Knobe and Christian Mott curated the “Experimental Philosophy Replication Page,” a webpage 
dedicated to collecting all direct replications of experiment philosophy findings (be they 
published or unpublished).2 As of November 2017, the page identifies 99 direct replications of 
experimental philosophy studies, with 42 of these having been classified as unsuccessful 
replications. Using these data as the basis for an estimate, the replication rate for experimental 
philosophy would be 57.6%. Although this is higher than the estimate for psychology derived by 
the OSC (2015), it is still not very encouraging. 
 But such an estimate would be misleading. Studies that appear on the Replication Page 
are those that have attracted the interest—or suspicion—of the researchers who attempted to 
replicate the studies. By contrast, there is likely to be little motivation to replicate a finding that 
is relatively unsurprising or intuitively robust, which in turn would lead to an exclusion bias 
against the plausibly more replicable findings. Thus, it is doubtful that studies on the Replication 
Page constitute a representative sample of experimental philosophy studies. Further support for 
this view comes from the fact that cross-cultural studies and gender comparisons are vastly 
overrepresented on the Replication Page, accounting for 41 replications out of 99 (41.4%), a rate 
that is far beyond the true proportion of such studies (see Knobe, 2016). 
Given such considerations, a large and representative sample of studies should be 
selected and assessed for their (direct) replicability. To accomplish this task, we took inspiration 
from prior replication initiatives such as the OSC project in psychology, and established the X-
Phi Replicability Project (XRP), a coordinated effort involving more than 40 researchers from 20 
replication teams across 8 countries tasked with conducting and interpreting high-quality direct 
replications of a wide-ranging sub-set of x-phi studies. Our goal was to derive an accurate 
estimate of the reproducibility of results obtained by experimental philosophers. 
 
1.2. Interpreting replications 
We begin with a note of caution. Scientists have long understood the importance of replicating 
each other’s work: it is not enough for you to report that you ran an experiment and obtained 
                                                          
2 http://experimental-philosophy.yale.edu/xphipage/Experimental%20Philosophy-Replications.html  
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certain results; I should be able to run the same experiment and obtain the same results, if I am to 
be justified in placing confidence in what you reported (Schmidt, 2009). But this is clearly an 
oversimplification. Even under the best of circumstances, one can never run exactly the same 
experiment that another scientist ran: at the very least, time will have passed between the original 
experiment and the replication. Moreover, the materials, methods, setting, and background 
conditions may differ to some degree as well, despite one’s best efforts to keep these functionally 
the same (Collins, 1975; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). A more accurate 
characterization of the follow-up study, then, is that it should be sufficiently similar along these 
and other relevant dimensions that one can meaningfully compare its results to those of the 
original study. In like manner, the results themselves should be sufficiently similar to the original 
that one can be justified in concluding—however tentatively—that it is the same basic 
phenomenon being observed, notwithstanding the existence of random variation, statistical noise, 
measurement error, and so on.3 
Keeping this in mind, for purposes of estimation we needed to decide for each replication 
study whether it counted more in favor of, or against, the original reported finding: that is, 
whether it should be classed as a ‘successful’ or an ‘unsuccessful’ replication. There is no single 
or definitive way to do this (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 
2015). Rather, as with data derived from any study, one must take into consideration a number of 
factors in order to decide what those data can reasonably be taken to show. Our approach was to 
use three different methods for designating a replication attempt as a success or a failure, and to 
report an overall reproducibility estimate based on each method. We will briefly describe these 
methods in turn: 
 
(a) Were the replication results statistically significant? For the present research, we 
defined ‘statistically significant’ as a p-value less than .05, following the currently 
                                                          
3 In practice, it can be hard to determine whether the ‘sufficiently similar’ criterion has actually been 
fulfilled by the replication attempt, whether in its methods or in its results (Nakagawa & Parker, 2015). It 
can therefore be challenging to interpret the results of replication studies, no matter which way these 
results turn out (Collins, 1975; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015). Thus, our 
findings should be interpreted with care: they should be seen as a starting point for further research, not as 
a final statement about the existence or non-existence of any individual effect. For instance, we were not 
able to replicate Machery et al. (2004), but this study has been replicated on several other occasions, 
including in children (Li, Liu, Chalmers, & Snedeker, 2018; for a review, see Machery, 2017, chapter 2). 
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conventional default standards for Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST). 
However, we must emphasize that the exclusive use of the p-value in a single study to 
draw inferences about the existence of an effect is controversial (Amrhein & 
Greenland, 2017; Benjamin et al., in press; Trafimow & Earp, 2017). Thus, p-values 
should serve as just one piece of information out of many such pieces in a robust, 
flexible, and context-sensitive inferential process (American Statistical Association, 
2016; Lakens et al., 2018; McShane, Gal, Gelman, Robert, & Tackett, 2017; 
Murtaugh, 2014). Moreover, the use of p-values as a criterion for success is especially  
dubious when applied to studies reporting null results (Boyle, in press), thus calling 
for alternate ways of assessing replication success. 
(b) Subjective assessment of the replicating team. Although a subjective judgment 
may seem less reliable than a hard-and-fast decision procedure like NHST, this 
approach has certain advantages. As noted, a single p-value is only one piece of 
information in an overall judgment about what the data show (American Statistical 
Association, 2016). By asking our researchers to register their overall subjective 
judgment about whether the effect replicated, therefore, they were able to take into 
consideration the ‘wider picture’ concerning, e.g., facets of study design, 
methodological details, aspects of the underlying theory as they bear on prediction, 
and so on. 
(c) Comparison of the original and replication effect size. The theoretical significance 
of an effect does not depend only on its existence but also on its size (Cumming, 
2013). What counts as a successful replication on the p-value criterion might not 
always count as a satisfactory replication from a theoretical point of view (see Box 1). 
Thus, one can also estimate the success of one’s replication attempt by comparing the 
original effect size to the replication effect size. Because sample sizes of replication 
studies were typically larger than those of original ones, and because calculation of 
confidence intervals (CIs) for original effect sizes were not always possible (due to a 
lack of information), we decided to draw this comparison by investigating whether 
the original effect size fell within the 95% CI of the replication effect size. 
15 
 
Box 1. What counts as a successful replication? The importance of effect sizes and theory 
 
Based on these three criteria, the X-Phi Replicability Project aimed to evaluate the 
reproducibility of experimental philosophy. The first step was to select a representative sample 
of studies. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Study selection 
Selected studies. 40 studies were selected for replication. For each year between 2003 and 2015 
(included), three papers were selected: one as the most cited paper for this year, and two at 
random (except for 2003, for which only two papers were available). This yielded a total of 38 
studies, to which we added 4 additional studies in case some of the originally selected studies 
proved too challenging to replicate. Out of these 42 studies, we were ultimately able to attempt to 
replicate 40. 
 
Selection history. To establish an exhaustive, non-arbitrary list of experimental philosophy 
papers, we began with the papers indexed on the Experimental Philosophy Page 
(http://experimental-philosophy.yale.edu/ExperimentalPhilosophy.html), a resource commonly 
used by experimental philosophers to make their papers publicly available, and the most 
Whether something counts as a successful replication depends in part on what the theoretical significance 
of a given effect-size estimate is. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) once argued that the negative 
emotional reactions elicited by certain actions might impact our judgments about free will and moral 
responsibility in a (theoretically) significant way, and that this might in turn explain why people are prone 
to attribute free will and moral responsibility to deterministic agents on some occasions but not others. In 
their original study, shifting from a ‘low-affect’ to a ‘high-affect’ action raised the rate of moral 
responsibility attributions from 23% to 64%, thus changing participants’ modal answer. However, in a 
meta-analysis based on several unpublished replications, Feltz and Cova (2014) found that, although there 
was indeed a significant effect of affect, this effect was very small and accounted for only 1% of the 
variance in participants’ answers. Thus, though Nichols and Knobe’s effect might be seen as having been 
‘successfully replicated’ according to the p-value criterion, the smaller effect size estimate from the meta-
analysis of replications stands in tension with their original theoretical conclusions, as the original authors 
acknowledge (Knobe, personal communication). 
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comprehensive available collection of experimental philosophy papers.4 However, an initial 
search through this database revealed that a non-trivial number of papers fell well outside of 
“experimental philosophy” as we have described it above and as it is typically understood, 
including papers about, e.g., pragmatic abilities in people with autism spectrum disorder (De 
Villiers, Stainton, & Szatmari, 2007) or the way people choose to punish norm violators in real-
life situations (Clavien et al., 2012). 
To narrow our choice down and prevent the inclusion of such outliers, we supplemented 
our preliminary approach with a list of 35 scientific journals. The list was established by XRP 
coordinators Florian Cova and Brent Strickland by excluding journals from the Experimental 
Philosophy website that were not known for publishing “experimental philosophy” papers as 
defined earlier, and then systematically collecting the reference of every paper from the 
remaining journals that contained at least one empirical study (i.e., a study involving the 
collection of data from participants or any other source in order to test a given hypothesis). 
From this set of papers, we retained only those that were published between 2003 and 
2015. The upper limit was set by the fact that study selection took place in Spring 2016. The 
lower limit was set by the fact that experimental philosophy papers only began to be regularly 
published starting in 2003, mostly in the wake of Joshua Knobe’s two seminal papers on 
intentional action and side-effects (Knobe, 2003a, 2003b).5  At the end of this process, our list of 
potential papers contained 242 references that met the following criteria: (i) featuring on the 
“Experimental Philosophy Page”, (ii) being published in one of the 35 journals we identified, and 
(iii) being published between 2003 and 2015. 
 To generate our sample, we selected three papers per year between 2004 and 2015 
included (for 2003, we selected two papers, as there were only two available for that year, as 
noted). The first paper was the most cited paper of the year (according to Google Scholar) and 
                                                          
4 Note that this page is basically a mirror of the “Experimental philosophy” category of the Philpapers 
database. 
5 Despite two important studies published in 2001 (Greene et al., 2001; Weinberg, Nichols & Stich, 
2001), no experimental philosophy paper is to be found for 2002. 
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the second and third were selected at random. This yielded a total of 38 papers selected for 
replication.6   
 Our next step was to evaluate individual studies in terms of their feasibility for being 
replicated. We identified four studies as being more demanding than others on practical grounds 
on the basis that they required access to a special population (Machery et al., 2004, requiring 
Chinese participants; Knobe and Burra, 2006, requiring Hindi-speaking participants; Lam, 2010, 
requiring Cantonese speakers; and Zalla and Leboyer, 2011, requiring individuals with high-
functioning autism). Because we could not ensure that replication teams would have the 
wherewithal to conduct these replications in the available time, a second, plausibly more 
feasible, study was selected as a potential replacement—either at random if the original paper 
was selected at random; or the second most-cited paper of the year if the original was the most 
cited.7 When both the ‘demanding’ replication and its more feasible replacement were conducted 
on time, we decided to include both results in our final analysis. In the end, although we were 
able to conduct a replication of Machery et al. (2004) and Knobe & Burra (2006), no replication 
team had the resources necessary to replicate Lam (2010) or Zalla and Leboyer (2011). We thus 
were left with 40 studies to replicate. The list of all papers (and studies) selected for replication 
can be found in Appendix 1.8 
 
2.2. Assignment of papers to replication teams  
                                                          
6 There was some initial debate about whether to include papers reporting negative results, that is, results 
that failed to reject the null hypothesis using NHST. We decided to do so when such results were used as 
the basis for a substantial claim. The reason for this was that negative results are sometimes treated as 
findings within experimental philosophy. For example, in experimental epistemology, the observation of 
negative results has led some to reach the substantive conclusion that practical stakes do not impact 
knowledge ascriptions (see for example Buckwalter, 2010; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; Rose et al., in 
press). Accordingly, papers reporting ‘substantive’ negative results were not excluded. 
7 Note, however, that the more ‘demanding’ paper that was originally selected was not discarded from our 
list, but remained there in case research teams with the required resources agreed to replicate these 
studies. 
8 It should be noted that two other papers were replaced during the replication process. For the year 2006, 
Malle (2006) was replaced with Nichols (2006), given that the original paper misreported both the results 
and statistical analyses, making comparison with replication impossible. For the same year, Cushman et 
al. (2006) proved to be too resource-demanding after all and was replaced by Nahmias et al. (2006). 
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The recruitment of replication teams (RTs) took place mostly between October and December 
2016. This involved an invitation for contributions that was included in a call for papers for a 
special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology devoted to the topic of replication. The 
call for papers was subsequently posted on various relevant websites; prominent researchers 
within the experimental philosophy community were also directly contacted and invited. 
 Once RTs committed to joining the replication project, they were sent the full list of 
papers that had not yet been assigned. RTs were invited to estimate the number of replications 
they could feasibly undertake, and to identify all papers from the available list they could not 
handle, either because (i) they did not have the resources necessary, or (ii) this would have 
involved some conflict of interest. Based on these constraints, papers were then randomly 
assigned to RTs. 
 
2.3. Pre-replication procedure 
For each paper, RTs were first asked to fill out a standardized pre-replication form (see 
Appendix 2). On this form, they were asked to identify the study they would replicate in the 
paper (in case the paper contained several studies, which was often the case). RTs were 
instructed to select the first study by default, unless they had a good reason not to (e.g., the first 
study was only a pilot, or suffered from clear methodological shortcomings that were corrected 
in later studies). The reason for this instruction was that many experimental philosophy papers 
present their most striking findings in the first study, with later studies being devoted to 
controlling for potential confounds or testing for more specific explanations of these results.9 
 Next, RTs were asked to report certain information about the study they selected to 
replicate. First and foremost, they were asked to identify the study’s main hypothesis (or to 
choose one hypothesis when several equally important hypotheses were tested within the same 
study). They were then asked to report what statistical analyses were employed to test this 
hypothesis and the results of these analyses (when no statistical analysis was reported, which 
occurred several times for early experimental philosophy studies, RTs were asked to reconstruct 
                                                          
9 In this respect, our methodology differed from the OSC’s methodology, which instructed replication 
teams to focus on the papers’ last study. 
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the appropriate statistical test). When possible, RTs were asked to compute the corresponding 
effect size and 95% confidence interval. 
 RTs were also asked to answer a few additional questions about the original study. 
Questions were about (i) the size and nature of the original sample, (ii) the presence or absence 
of a selection procedure, and (iii) whether the original paper contained all of the information 
necessary to properly conduct the replication. 
 Finally, RTs were asked to compute the sample size needed for their replication. For 
studies reporting significant results, the replication sample size was computed on the basis of the 
original effect size, assuming a power of 0.95. Because initial effect size estimates in the 
literature tend to be inflated due to publication bias (Anderson, Kelley & Maxwell, 2017; Button 
et al., 2013), we elected to use a higher than usual power assumption (typically .80) so that we 
would be able to detect even smaller effects that nevertheless do exist. For studies reporting null 
results (see footnote 6), RTs were instructed to use at least twice the reported sample size, given 
that the results might have been due insufficient power in the original study.  
Completed pre-replication forms were then sent to Florian Cova for approval. Once the 
forms were approved, RTs were instructed to pre-register their replication on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/), using the Pre-Registration form of the Replication Recipe (Brandt et 
al., 2014). Following best practices (Grens, 2014), RTs were also advised to contact authors of 
the original study to ensure the greatest fidelity along all relevant dimensions between the 
original study and the replication. Most original authors agreed to help the RTs, and we thank 
them for their contribution. 
 
2.4. Post-replication procedure 
After running the replication study, RTs were asked to fill out a post-replication form (see 
Appendix 3). The post-replication form asked RTs to report the procedure and results of their 
replication study as they would in a normal research paper. Then, they were asked to report about 
their study the same kind of information they reported about the original study in the pre-
replication form (effect size, 95% CI, size and nature of their sample). Finally, RTs were asked 
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to report their own subjective assessment about whether they successfully replicated the original 
result. 
 Once the post-replication form was completed, replication teams were instructed to 
upload it, along with the all relevant data and documentation, to the corresponding OSF 
depository, and to register their results using the post-registration form of the Replication Recipe 
(Brandt et al., 2014) if possible. 
 Details for all individual replications can be accessed online through the X-Phi 
Replicability Project main OSF page (osf.io/dvkpr). 
 
2.5. Replication teams (RTs) 
Overall, 20 RTs (involving 40 persons) took part in the replication project. Once the data were 
collected, an additional project member was recruited (Brian Earp) to aid with interpretation and 
theoretical framing, as well as drafting various sections of the manuscript. Research teams from 
8 countries (Brazil, France, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States) were involved. 
 
3. Results 
40 studies were repeated one time each in an attempt to replicate the originally reported results. 
Studies came from several different sub-areas of experimental philosophy: 8 from Action 
Theory, 1 from Aesthetics, 4 from Causation, 5 from Epistemology, 8 from Free Will, 8 from 
Moral Psychology, 1 from Philosophy of Language, 2 from Philosophy of Mind, 3 
uncategorized. 
The average N was 215.1 (SD = 542.3) for original studies and 206.3 (SD = 131.8) for 
replication.10 However, the mean for the original studies was biased by an extremely high N for 
one study with 3422 participants (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009). In fact, the median N was 85 for 
original studies and 183 for the replication studies. In 32 studies out of 39 that used participants 
                                                          
10 Ns were computed not from the total N recruited for the whole study but from the number of data points 
included in the relevant statistical analysis. 
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(excluding Reuter, 2011, that used internet hits as data points), the replication N was greater than 
the original N. Overall, mean Ns for original studies tended to increase over time, going from an 
average of 57.5 in 2003 to 162 in 2015. 
 Both original and replication studies made ample use of convenience samples, but there 
were differences between the two. The original studies, particularly in the early years of 
experimental philosophy, tended to use university students: out of 39 studies, 25 used student 
samples, 6 used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers, 4 used other online samples, and 4 
used pedestrians recruited from the street. On the contrary, replication studies tended to focus on 
online samples: out of 39 studies, 29 used MTurk workers, 6 used other online samples, and 4 
used university students. This difference in populations comes with the possible disadvantage of 
lowering replication rates—insofar as the original findings were dependent upon a particular 
population—but simultaneously allows for an assessment of generalizability (see below). 
 Out of 32 studies reporting a significant result and for which we could perform the 
relevant power analysis, 26 had a power superior or equal to 0.80, and 18 had a power superior 
or equal to .95 (assuming the original study’s effect size). The average power was 0.88 (SD = 
0.14).11 
To assess the successful replication rate, we used three different criteria as described 
earlier: (i) the RT’s subjective assessment, (ii) p-values and statistical significance, and (iii) 
comparison of the original and replication effect sizes. 
 
3.1. Replication team’s subjective assessment 
We first examined RTs’ subjective assessment of whether they had successfully replicated the 
original results. Out of 40 replications, 31 were considered to be successful replications by the 
RTs that conducted them, yielding a successful replication rate of 77.5% by this metric. The 
replication rate was 78.4% (29 out of 37) for original studies presenting significant results, and 
66.7% (2 out of 3) for original studies presenting null results.  
 
                                                          
11 For this analysis, studies for which power > 0.99 were counted as power = 0.99. 
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3.2. p-values 
We then assessed replication success using the p-values obtained by the RTs. For original studies 
presenting statistically significant results, a replication was considered successful when p < .05 
and the effect went in the same direction as the original effect. The 3 studies presenting null 
results were excluded from this analysis, given the difficulty of assessing such results using 
NHST (Boyle, in press). 
 By these criteria, the overall successful replication rate was 78.4% (29 out of 37). 
 
3.3. Comparison of original and replication effect sizes 
As a final criterion for successful replication, we compared the original and replication effect 
sizes. First, when possible, original and replication effect sizes were converted to a common r 
effect size, and 95% CI interval were computed for both. This was possible when the 
corresponding statistical test was either (i) a Chi-square test with df  = 1, (ii) a Student’s or 
Welch t-test, (iii) a correlation test, or (iv) an ANOVA with df1 = 1. When this was not possible, 
alternate effect sizes and 95% CIs were used (such as RMSEA for Structural Equation 
Modelling). When the replication obtained an effect that went in the opposite direction to the 
original effect, replication effect sizes were coded as negative. Effect sizes and 95% CI for 
replication are presented in Figure 1. 
For studies reporting statistically significant results, we treated as successful replications 
for which the replication 95% CI was not lower than the original effect size.12 For studies 
reporting null results, we treated as successful replications for which original effect sizes fell 
inside the bounds of the 95% CI. 
We were able to calculate (i) the original effect size and (ii) the replication 95% CI for 34 
studies out of 40 (32 original studies reporting significant effects, 2 reporting null effects). 
                                                          
12 For studies reporting statistically significant results, we counted studies for which the original effect 
size was smaller than the replication 95% CI as successful replications on the ground that, given the 
studies’ original hypotheses, a greater effect size than originally expected constituted even more evidence 
in favor of these hypotheses. Of course, theoretically, this need not always be the case, for example if a 
given hypothesis makes precise predictions about the size of an effect. But for the studies we attempted to 
replicate, a greater effect size did indeed signal greater support for the hypothesis.  
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Details of the results are presented in Table 1. Overall, according to this more stringent 
criterion13, the overall successful replication rate was 24 successful replications out of 34 
(70.6%). 
 
                                                          
13 As pointed out by a reviewer on this paper, this criterion might even be considered too stringent. This is 
because, in certain circumstances in which no prediction is made about the size of an effect, a replication 
for which the 95% CI falls below the original effect size might still be considered as a successful 
replication, given that there is a significant effect in the predicted direction. Other ways of assessing 
replication success using effect sizes might include computing whether there is a statistical difference 
between the original and replication effect size (which would present the disadvantage of rewarding 
underpowered studies), or considering whether the replication effect size fell beyond the lower bound of 
the 95% CI of the original effect size (which returns a rate of 28 successful replications out of 34 original 
studies, i.e. 82.4%). Nevertheless, we decided to err on the side of stringency. 
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Figure 1. Original effect size, replication effect size and replication 95% CI for each study. For 
descriptions of “Content Based,” “Observational Data,” “Context Based,” and “Demographic 
Effect” see Section 4.3.  
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Original effect size is 
__ the replication 95% 
CI 
Below Within Over 
Significant effects 5 18 9 
Null effects 0 1 1 
 
Table 1. Results for the comparison of the original effect size with the replication 95% CI. Bold 
numbers indicate replications that count as successful. 
 
 Of note, when focusing on studies originally reporting statistically significant results, it 
seemed that only 9 out of 32 (28.1%) overestimated their effect size compared to the replication 
estimate (assuming that the latter is more accurate). For these 32 studies, the average original r 
effect size was 0.39 (SD = 0.16), while the average replication r effect size was 0.34 (SD = 0.24) 
(see Figure 2). The effect size for this difference was small (t(62) = 0.85, p = .40, d = 0.21, 
power = 0.22), suggesting that original effect sizes were not much larger than replication effect 
sizes. 
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Figure 2. Effect sizes (correlations) for original and replication studies. Replication studies are 
sorted by type of studies (observational, content-based, context-based, or demographic). 
 
3.4. Most cited vs. Random studies 
27 
 
In our study selection, we picked studies both at random and among the most cited ones. One 
reason for this procedure was that we wanted our estimate to be representative of both 
experimental philosophy at large (random selection) and the kinds of effects people are more 
likely to discuss when thinking about experimental philosophy (most-cited papers). Overall, the 
papers we selected as most cited had a greater number of citations per year ratio than papers we 
selected at random (M = 30.7, SD = 18.0 vs. M = 8.4, SD = 6.1; t(38) = 5.835, p < .001, d = 
1.93).14 
 
 Subjective assessment P-values Effect sizes 
Most cited (N=14) 64.3% 64.3% (9 out of 14) 54.5% (6 out of 11) 
Random (N=26) 84.6% 87.0% (20 out of 23) 78.3% (18 out of 23) 
TOTAL 77.5% 78.4% (29 out of 37) 70.6% (24 out of 34) 
Table 2. Replication rates according to three criteria (subjective assessments, p-values, and 
effect size comparisons) for most cited and randomly selected studies. 
 
 Table 2 summarizes the replication rates according to all three criteria for both most-cited 
and randomly selected studies. Overall, the replication rate for most-cited studies (subjective 
assessment = 64.3%) was lower than the replication rate for randomly selected studies 
(subjective assessment = 84.6%). However, a logistic regression did not reveal citation rates to 
be a significant predictor of success (measured through subjective assessment) (OR = -0.97, p = 
.18). Thus, due to the small size of our sample, it is not possible to determine with confidence 
whether this reflects an actual trend or is simply the product of random variation. 
 
3.5. Effect of publication year on replication success 
There was no evidence of an effect of publication year on replication success (as measured by p-
values or RTs’ subjective assessment), OR = 0.99, t = -0.14, p =.89. 
 
                                                          
14 This analysis was done on the basis of Google Scholar’s citation count (as of March 23rd, 2018). 
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3.6. Generalizability of results obtained on convenience samples 
As mentioned above, within our sample, most original studies used pedestrians or university 
students as convenience samples, while most replications used online survey participants (mostly 
MTurk workers) as convenience samples. This allows us to assess the generalizability of results 
obtained from such samples. Among our studies, we identified 24 in which the original sample 
was either a pedestrian (4 out of 24) or university student (20 out of 24) sample and the 
replication sample an online sample. Out of these 24 studies, 20 successfully replicated 
(according to RTs’ subjective assessment), a replication rate of 83.3%. Thus, it seems that most 
original findings based on convenience samples such as pedestrians or university students could 
be generalized to online samples (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). 
 
3.7. Summary 
Overall, our three criteria converge on the conclusion that the reproducibility rate of 
experimental philosophy studies, as estimated through our sample, is greater than 70%. 
Moreover, the analysis of effect sizes for studies originally reporting significant effects suggests 
that most of them did not overestimate their effect sizes compared to replications. 
 
4. Potential explanations for the relatively high replication rate 
Recall that, for the OSC attempt to estimate the reproducibility of psychological science, the 
replication rate was 36.1% - 47.4% depending on the measure, which is much lower than the 
roughly 70% replication rate we observed for x-phi studies. How are we to explain our finding 
that x-phi results seem to replicate at a far higher rate than results in psychological science? In 
the following sub-sections, we explore several different (though not mutually exclusive) 
answers. 
 
4.1. Larger effect sizes 
The OSC attempt found that effect sizes were good predictors of an effect’s replicability 
(Spearman’s rank-order correlation of 0.277 for the original effect size and of 0.710 for 
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replication effect sizes). Thus, the higher replicability rate of experimental philosophy results 
might be explained by those results’ being characterized by larger effect sizes. 
 For original effect sizes, the OSC reports an average r effect size of 0.403 (SD = 0.188). 
This is in fact higher than our average original r effect size (M = 0.38, SD = 0.16). But the initial 
estimates—at least for the psychology studies—were most likely inflated due to publication bias, 
relatively small sample sizes, and other factors (Anderson, Kelley, & Maxwell, 2017; Button et 
al., 2013). Let us assume that effect size estimates derived from replication studies are on 
average more accurate than those reported in original studies, due to the interaction of 
publication bias and statistical regression to the mean (Trafimow & Earp, 2017). In this case, 
replication effect sizes were actually higher for x-phi studies (M = 0.33, SD = 0.23), compared to 
psychology studies (M = 0.20, SD = 0.26). Since the most-cited and random x-phi studies did not 
differ in either original, t(32) = 0.30, p = .77, or replication effect size, t(35) = 0.18, p = .86, the 
large average effect among the sample of x-phi studies is not likely due to oversampling from 
highly-cited publications. This suggests that the true effect sizes reported in x-phi may tend to be 
on average larger than those in reported in psychology studies. This, in turn, would increase the 
relative likelihood of effects from x-phi studies replicating. 
 However, we should note that, at least among the studies we replicated, effects were 
especially large in the early years of experimental philosophy but have tended to get smaller over 
time. Indeed, publication year correlated negatively with effect size (converted to r) whether 
looking at original reports, r(31) = -.36, p = .040, or replication data, r(34) = -.37, p = .025 (see 
Figure 3), even when excluding studies that were originally reported as null results (original, 
r(30) = -.42, p = .017; replication, r(32) = -.44, p = .009). One possible explanation for this trend 
is that later studies tend to be attempts to elaborate on initial findings by decomposing them into 
constituent parts, as illustrated by the trolley literature (Cova, 2017) or the literature on the side-
effect effect (Cova, 2016). Another possibility is that it is increasingly unlikely over time that 
one will observe a large effect that had previously gone unnoticed. However, such possibilities 
would best be explored by analyzing the effects of publication year on the population of 
experimental philosophy studies as a whole, which is not something we are able to undertake 
based on our sample. 
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Figure 3. Original and replication effect sizes per year. 
 
4.2. Cost of studies 
Another explanation for the higher replicability rate for experimental philosophy compared to 
psychology could be that x-phi studies are, on average, ‘easier’ to run – in large part by being 
less costly. Indeed, many experimental philosophy studies are simple surveys that can be 
relatively quickly and inexpensively administered. 
This feature might explain the higher replication rate in two ways. First, ‘easier’ studies 
might lead to larger sample sizes, which in turn might lead to higher-powered studies. To test for 
this hypothesis, we compared sample sizes in our sample to typical sample sizes in social-
personality psychology. According to Fraley and Vazire (2014), median sample sizes in the latter 
field range from 73 to 178, depending on the journals. As we saw, the median N for our studies 
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was 85, which falls within this range. Moreover, assuming a typical effect size  or r = .20, Fraley 
and Vazire found that the power of the typical social-personality psychology study was below 
the recommended 80% and even reached 40% for certain journals. Using a similar method, we 
computed power assuming an effect size of r = .20 for original x-phi studies for which a r effect 
size could theoretically be computed (34 out of 40). The average power was 0.5 (SD = 0.28) and 
only 7 studies out of 34 reached a power > .80. Thus, if the easiness of running experimental 
philosophy studies explains our higher replication rate, it is not because it allowed our original 
studies to be higher-powered than typical psychology studies.  
However, there is a second way in which ‘easiness’ might explain the higher replicability 
rate: because there is relatively little cost (in terms of time and resources) in running an x-phi 
study, experimental philosophers can recruit more participants per condition, double-check their 
results by re-running the study if they are uncertain about any findings, and subject their results 
to scrutiny by others, who can in turn easily run their own replications. By contrast, the more 
time- or resource-intensive it is to obtain data, the more distressed a researcher may feel about 
failing to get something ‘publishable’ out of the effort. This in turn could promote so-called 
Questionable Research Practices (Fiedler & Schwartz, 2016; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012) 
which may increase the likelihood of committing a Type 1 error (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011).  
 To test this second ‘easiness’ hypothesis, we rated our 40 studies according to how easy 
to run we perceived them to be. Scores ranged from 0 to 2. One ‘difficulty’ point was awarded to 
studies that were not simple surveys that could have potentially been run online (for example, 
studies that involved a cognitive load task and as such required an in-lab setting, such as Greene 
et al., 2008). An additional ‘difficulty’ point was awarded to studies that required an unusual 
population and so could not be run using a convenience sample (for example, cross-cultural 
studies comparing specific populations, such as in Machery et al., 2004). In the end, no study 
received a score of 2: 36 studies received a score of 0, and 4 a score of 1. This highlights the 
relative ‘easiness’ of running x-phi studies in general. As expected, the replicability rate for 
‘difficult’ studies was lower than the rate for ‘easy’ studies: 50% (2 out of 4) compared to 80.6% 
(29 out of 36). 
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 What about psychology studies? To complete the comparison, we went back to the list of 
studies replicated by the OSC project and selected 99 of them that (i) were included in the final 
OSC analysis and (ii) made the results of the replication available. We then rated them in the 
same way as we rated the x-phi studies. Overall, out of 99 studies, 17 received a score of 0, 70 a 
score of 1, and 12 a score of 2. This suggest that psychology studies were indeed more ‘difficult’ 
to run on average, which might factor into the difference in replication rate between 
experimental philosophy and psychological science. However, within the OSC project, the 
replicability rate was not much higher for ‘easy’ studies (43.8%, 7 out of 16), compared to 
‘medium’ (38.2%, 26 out of 68) and ‘difficult’ studies (36.4%, 4 out of 11), which suggests that 
other factors than ‘easiness’ might be at play. 
 
4.3. Type of effects 
Why else, then, might our replication rate have been so much higher? Another hypothesis is that 
the high replication rate for x-phi studies might be due to the kind of effect studied by 
experimental philosophers. Indeed, the studies selected for replication in our project can be 
organized into four main categories: 
 
1) Observational studies: These are studies that do not involve data collected in an 
experimental setting in which independent variables are under the direct control of the 
experimenter, but rather make use of other kinds of data (e.g. instances of linguistic 
expressions in a corpus as in Reuter, 2011). 
2) Content-based studies: These are studies that focus on how participants perform a certain 
task or react to certain stimuli (e.g., how intentional they find an action to be), and how 
their behavior is determined by the content of the task or stimuli. Experimental 
manipulation in these studies typically focuses on changing certain properties of the task 
or the content of the stimuli and testing whether this change affects participants’ 
responses (e.g., changing the side effect of an action from ‘harming the environment’ to 
‘helping the environment’ and seeing how this affects participants’ judgments of an 
agent’s intention, as in Knobe, 2003a). 
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3) Context-based studies: These are studies that keep the content of a task or stimulus 
constant but explore how participants’ reactions can be changed by manipulating the 
context and the way in which the content is presented (e.g., presenting the stimuli with or 
without cognitive load as in Greene et al., 2008; presenting the same vignette in a first- 
versus third-person framing as in Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008). 
4) Demographic effects: These are studies that keep both the content of the stimulus and/or 
task and the context in which it is presented constant, but explore how participants’ 
answers can be shaped by differences in the participants themselves (e.g., cross-cultural 
comparisons such as in Machery et al., 2004; correlations between character traits and 
philosophical intuitions as in Nadelhoffer, Kvaran & Nahmias, 2009). 
 
In investigating the effect of kind of study on the replicability of experimental philosophy, we 
tested two related hypotheses. The first is that most x-phi studies fall into the second category: 
they study how participants’ reactions to a given stimulus (vignette) are shaped by properties of 
the stimulus itself (its content). The second is that, at least within our sample, effects of the 
second kind (content-based) are less fragile than effects of the third (context-based) and fourth 
(demographic effects) kinds. Indeed, context-based effects are often dependent on the 
participant’s attention, and her or his ignorance of the manipulation (Cesario, 2014), while 
demographic effects are threatened by intra-group variability (Heine et al., 2002). 
 To test these hypotheses, we first classified our 40 studies as falling within one of these 
four categories: 1 fell into the observational category, 31 fell into the content-based category, 4 
into the context-based category, and 4 into the demographic effect category.15 These results 
support the first hypothesis: experimental philosophy studies seem to be mostly content-based, 
focusing on how (a change in) the content of a given stimulus (typically a vignette) impacts 
participants’ reactions. 
 We next tested the second hypothesis, asking whether content-based studies are more 
replicable than the others. Table 3 sums up the replication rate (based on RTs’ subjective 
assessment) for each category (excluding the observational category, for which we only had one 
                                                          
15 In a previous version of this manuscript, we reported 30 content-based studies and 5 demographic 
effects. However, helpful commentaries from readers, including Wesley Buckwalter, led us to revise our 
classification for Nichols (2004). 
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data point). For our sample at least, it does appear that content-based studies have a higher 
replication rate when compared to context-based and demographic-based studies.16 They also 
tended to have larger effect sizes (see Figure 2). 
 
Type of effect Replication rate Average original 
effect size 
Average replication 
effect size 
Content-based 90.3% 0.41 (0.17) 0.39 (0.21) 
Context-based 25.0% 0.22 (0.08) 0.01 (0.06) 
Demographic effect 25.0% 0.29 (0.10) 0.12 (0.10) 
 
Table 3. Replication, average original effect size and replication effect size for each category of 
studies 
 
 Of course, this conclusion pre-supposes that context-based and demographic-based 
studies make up a greater proportion of studies in traditional psychological science than in 
experimental philosophy. To determine whether this is really the case, we went back once again 
to the list of 99 OSC studies we selected, and categorized them in the same way we categorized 
x-phi studies. We ended up with 34 content-based studies, 44 context-based studies, 16 
demographic-based studies, 4 observational studies, and 1 that was uncategorized. Thus, content-
based studies played a less important role in psychological science than in experimental 
philosophy (χ2(1, N = 139) = 19.62, p <.001). Moreover, the replication rate for content-based 
studies was 64.5%, while it was 20.5% for context-based studies and 31.3% for demographic-
based studies.  
Thus, the difference in replication rates between experimental philosophy and 
psychological science might be explained by the different kinds of effects they typically 
investigate: while experimental philosophy focus mostly on robust effects triggered by changes 
                                                          
16 A low replication rate for demographic-based effects should not be taken as direct evidence for the 
nonexistence of variations between demographic groups. Indeed, out of 3 demographic-based effects that 
failed to replicate, one was a null effect, meaning that the failed replication found an effect where there 
was none in the original study. 
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in the content of the very stimulus participants are asked to react to, traditional psychological 
science tends to focus more on subtle effects wherein participants are led to react differently to a 
given stimulus by external changes. This contrast might be heightened by the fact that many of 
the content-based effects investigated by experimental philosophers are effects that can be 
accessed to some extent introspectively. For example, Dunaway, Edmonds and Manley (2013) 
found that philosophers were able to predict a priori some central results in experimental 
philosophy. In this respect, parts of experimental philosophy might be compared to works in 
linguistics, and derive their reliability from the fact that some effects are robust enough to be 
introspectively assessed (see Sprouse & Almeida, 2017). 
 
4.4. Differences in culture and practice 
Finally, it might be that differences in replication rates could be explained by differences in 
academic cultures and research practices. Based on such perceived differences, Liao (2015) 
predicted a higher replication rate for experimental philosophy studies before the launch of the 
XRP. As philosophers, Liao noted, x-phi researchers might be more sensitive to certain 
methodological questions, such as what counts as strong evidence for a given claim; moreover, 
they might have a more welcoming attitude toward replication – in part due to the typically low 
cost of running x-phi studies, as mentioned above – and be more transparent in some of their 
research practices.17  
These perceived characteristics of the practice and culture of experimental philosophy 
might have contributed to the relatively high replication rate by discouraging questionable 
research practices. Although these claims are hard to test directly, a few indicators provide 
indirect support. First, as noted, published effect sizes for x-phi studies appeared to be only 
slightly (and non-significantly) overestimated as compared to effect sizes in the replication 
attempts: ratio of mean-replication to mean-original effect size = .88, paired t(31) = 1.67, p = .11. 
Second, when researchers p-hack, the resulting distribution of p-values below .05  tends to be flat 
                                                          
17 Possible reasons for such transparency might be that (i) experimental philosophy is still a smaller 
academic community where individual researchers are likelier to be well known to each other and thus 
able and willing to hold each other accountable, and (ii) research resources (such as online survey 
accounts) used to be shared among researchers in the early days of the field, thus making questionable 
research practices more difficult to obscure (see Liao, 2015). 
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or even leftward skewed (Simonsohn, Nelson & Simmons, 2014), whereas the p-curve for our 
target set of x-phi findings revealed a substantial rightward skew (see Figure 4), with few p-
values in the .025 - .05 range. Finally, recent research by Colombo and colleagues (2017) found 
that the rate of statistical reporting inconsistencies was lower in experimental philosophy than in 
others parts of behavioral science. In any case, Liao (2015) does seem to have been right with his 
prediction, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the higher observed replicability of x-phi 
findings compared to psychology findings might reflect particular cultural values and research 
practices within the field. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of p values corresponding to target effects in original publications, 
generated by the p-curve app (www.p-curve.com; see Simonsohn, Nelson & Simmons, 2014). 
Three studies reported insufficient information to calculate precise p values, and therefore are 
excluded. Two other p values (> .05) were not displayed. 
 
One such cultural value might be a greater tolerance or even appreciation among 
experimental philosophers for negative or null results. As many have argued, the systematic non-
publication of null results – which contributes to the so-called file-drawer effect – is a leading 
factor in increasing the proportion of false positives in the literature and thus of non-replicable 
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effects (Earp, 2017; Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014; Rosenthal, 1979). In our experience, 
experimental philosophers tend to have a more positive attitude toward null results: they take 
null results from adequately powered studies to have some evidential value, and indeed some key 
findings in experimental philosophy are based on failures to reject the null hypothesis (which 
might explain why 10% of the studies we sought to replicate were null results, while studies with 
null results only constituted 3% of OSC’s original pool). Moreover, null results that are clearly 
or at least plausibly due to weaknesses in the study design can be discarded without too much 
anguish: as noted, x-phi studies tend to be fairly easy as well as inexpensive to run, such that 
there is little incentive to ‘tease’ an ultimately dubious finding out of a data set for the sake of 
publication. Instead, one can simply run another, better-designed study, only submitting for 
publication results in which one has high confidence (ideally because one has already replicated 
them in one’s own lab). 
In fact, compared to ‘traditional’ psychologists, experimental philosophers may be less 
susceptible to such ‘publish-or-perish’ pressures in general. First, it is presumably far easier to 
abstain from publishing the (dubious) results of a study that took a few days or weeks to run – as 
is common in x-phi research – than a study that took many months to run at potentially great 
cost. And second, experimental philosophers may not need to publish data-driven papers in order 
to maintain or advance their careers in the first place. In their capacity as philosophers, at least, 
they may have ample opportunities to publish papers without any data—i.e., dealing ‘purely’ 
with theoretical issues—and the publication pressure is generally lower in philosophy. Taken 
together, these and the above-mentioned factors might create field-specific norms and practices 
that decrease the likelihood of false positives proliferating throughout the literature. Finally, 
although we do not have direct evidence of this, it is possible that philosophy journals are on 
average less reluctant than psychology journals to publish null results. If so, this would diminish 
problems associated with the file-drawer effect, thus reducing the proportion of non-replicable 
effects.18 
 
                                                          
18 One more cynical explanation would simply be that experimental philosophers are less well versed in 
into statistics, and that certain questionable research practices are only available to those who have 
sufficient skills in this area (i.e., the ability to take advantage of highly complex statistical models or 
approaches to produce ‘findings’ that are of questionable value). 
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5. Conclusion 
In this project, our goal was to reach a rough estimate of the reproducibility of experimental 
philosophy studies. We sampled 40 studies from the experimental philosophy literature, and 
drew on the resources of 20 separate research teams from across 8 countries to undertake a high-
quality replication of each one. Based on three different classification systems, we converged on 
an estimated replication rate situated between 70% and 78%. This means that, roughly, the 
replication rate for experimental philosophy would be 3 out 4. 
 This appears to be good news for experimental philosophy. As a new field, it has been 
subjected to criticism from skeptical quarters, including the claim that it is little more than bad 
psychology—an upstart enterprise run by philosophers who mimic the methods of behavioral 
science without fully mastering or even understanding them (Cullen, 2010; Woolfolk, 2013). In 
the wake of the replication crisis, this line of thought gave rise to the companion-in-guilt 
argument: if experimental philosophy is just bad psychology, and if psychology suffers from a 
serious replication problem, then we should expect experimental philosophy to fare even worse 
(see Liao, 2015). Indeed, the replication crisis in psychology has sometimes been framed as a 
limitation of—or argument against—experimental philosophy (see Loeb & Alfano, 2014, section 
5.1).19 
In this context, the results of the current replication initiative appear to provide a strong, 
empirically-based answer to these criticisms. In particular, our observed replication rate of over 
70% seems to undermine pessimistic inductions from low replicability rates in psychology and 
other behavioral sciences to presumed replication rates in experimental philosophy. It also calls 
into question the idea of x-phi being mere ‘amateurish’ psychology, suffering from the same 
shortcomings and methodological issues as the latter, only worse. Simply put, such a 
characterization of experimental philosophy is inconsistent with our findings.  
Of course, these results should not be taken as invitation for experimental philosophers to 
rest on their laurels and no longer worry about methodological issues in the behavioral sciences. 
As long as we are uncertain of the reason behind experimental philosophy’s high replication rate, 
                                                          
19 For example, as of November 2017, the Wikipedia page for “Experimental Philosophy” dedicates a 
large part of its “Criticisms” section to the “Problem of Reproducibility,” arguing that “a parallel with 
experimental psychology is likely.” 
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we cannot reasonably infer that future experimental philosophy studies will meet the same 
success. That said, we have considered a number of potential factors: the apparently larger 
typical effect sizes in x-phi studies, the lower cost of running survey-based experiments, the 
different kinds of manipulations characteristic of x-phi research (e.g., content-based vs. context-
based), and perceived cultural norms discouraging the use of questionable research practices 
while encouraging greater transparency and acceptance of null results. Each of these 
explanations makes a different prediction: for example, if the high replication rate of 
experimental philosophy depends on the size of the effects it typically investigates, then we 
would need to adjust our practice as experimental philosophy begins searching for more subtle 
and smaller effects. If it is due to experimental philosophy’s focus on easy-to-run, content-based 
studies, then a similarly high rate should not be taken for granted as more complex, context-
based studies begin to become more widespread. And finally, if it stems from values and 
practices that are specific to the field, then we should try to maintain and foster this positive 
culture. The current project, which could not have been possible without the contribution of so 
many dedicated researchers willing to engage in a good-faith collective enterprise to examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of their science, might be one important step in this direction. 
 
OSF Repository 
Details, methods and results for all replications can be found online at https://osf.io/dvkpr/ 
 
Softwares 
Most of the analyses reported in this manuscript were conducted using the R {compute.es} and 
{pwr} packages (Champely, 2018; Del Re, 2015). We are also indebted to Lakens’ R2D2 sheet 
(Lakens, 2013). 
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Appendix 1. List of studies selected for replication 
(Crossed-out studies are studies who were planned for replications but did not get replicated.) 
*2003 
Most cited: Knobe, J. (2003a). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 
63(279), 190-194. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/hdz5x/) 
Random: Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental 
investigation. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 309-324. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, 
osf.io/78sqa/) 
*2004 
Most cited: Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2004). Semantics, cross-cultural 
style. Cognition, 92(3), B1-B12. (Demographic effect, successful, osf.io/qdekc/) 
- Replacement: Knobe, J. (2004). Intention, intentional action and moral considerations. 
Analysis, 64(282), 181-187. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/ka5wv/) 
Random 1: Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe 
and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24(2), 259-269. (Content-
based, unsuccessful, osf.io/w9bza/) 
Random 2: Nichols, S. (2004). After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment. 
Philosophical Psychology, 17(1), 3-26. [Study 3] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/bv4ep/)  
*2005 
Most cited: Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying freedom: 
Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology, 18(5), 561-
584. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/4gvd5/) 
Random 1: McCann, H. J. (2005). Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies. 
Philosophical Psychology, 18(6), 737-748. [Study 1] (Context-based, null effect, successful, 
osf.io/jtsnn/)  
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Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T. (2005). Skill, luck, control, and intentional action. Philosophical 
Psychology, 18(3), 341-352. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/6ds5e/) 
*2006 
Most cited: Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and 
intuition in moral judgment testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 
1082-1089. 
- Replacement:  Nahmias, E., Morris, S. G., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2006). Is 
incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(1), 28-53. 
[Study 2] (Content-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/m8t3k/) 
Random 1: Knobe, J., & Burra, A. (2006). The folk concepts of intention and intentional action: 
A cross-cultural study. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1), 113-132. (Content-based, 
successful, osf.io/p48sa/) 
- Replacement: Malle, B. F. (2006). Intentionality, morality, and their relationship in 
human judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1), 87-112. 
- Replacement: Nichols, S. (2006). Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of Cognition and 
Culture, 6(1), 57-86. [Study 2] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/8kf3p/) 
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some 
problems for juror impartiality. Philosophical Explorations, 9(2), 203-219. (Content-based, 
successful, osf.io/bv42c/) 
*2007 
Most cited: Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The 
cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous, 41(4), 663-685. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, 
osf.io/stjwg/) 
Random 1: Nahmias, E., Coates, D. J., & Kvaran, T. (2007). Free will, moral responsibility, and 
mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 214-242. 
(Content-based, successful, osf.io/pjdkg/) 
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Random 2: Livengood, J., & Machery, E. (2007). The folk probably don't think what you think 
they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 107-
127. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/7er6r/) 
*2008 
Most cited: Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). 
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144-
1154. (Context-based, unsuccessful, but with deviations from the original procedure, see 
osf.io/yb38c) 
Random 1: Gonnerman, C. (2008). Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up to Knobe 
and Roedder. Philosophical Psychology, 21(2), 193-205. (Content-based, successful, 
osf.io/wy8ab/) 
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T., & Feltz, A. (2008). The actor–observer bias and moral intuitions: 
adding fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s fire. Neuroethics, 1(2), 133-144. (Context-based, 
unsuccessful, osf.io/jb8yp/) 
*2009 
Most cited: Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. The Journal of Philosophy, 
106(11), 587-612. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/ykt7z/) 
Random 1: Roxborough, C., & Cumby, J. (2009). Folk psychological concepts: Causation. 
Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 205-213. (Content-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/5eanz/) 
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T., Kvaran, T., & Nahmias, E. (2009). Temperament and intuition: A 
commentary on Feltz and Cokely. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 351-355. (Demographic 
effect, null effect, unsuccessful, osf.io/txs86/) 
*2010 
Most cited: Beebe, J. R., & Buckwalter, W. (2010). The epistemic side‐ effect effect. Mind & 
Language, 25(4), 474-498. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/n6r3b/) 
Random 1: Lam, B. (2010). Are Cantonese-speakers really descriptivists? Revisiting cross-
cultural semantics. Cognition, 115(2), 320-329. 
44 
 
- Replacement: Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective 
experience. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 299-327. [Study 1] (Demographic effect, 
successful, osf.io/z2fj8/) 
Random 2: De Brigard, F. (2010). If you like it, does it matter if it's real? Philosophical 
Psychology, 23(1), 43-57. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/cvuwy/) 
*2011 
Most cited: Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation, and 
culpable control. The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670-696. [Study 1] (Content-based, 
unsuccessful, osf.io/4yuym/) 
Random 1: Zalla, T., & Leboyer, M. (2011). Judgment of intentionality and moral evaluation in 
individuals with high functioning autism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(4), 681-698. 
- Replacement: Reuter, K. (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance from the Reality of Pain. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9-10), 94-109. (Observational data, successful, 
osf.io/3sn6j/) 
Random 2: Sarkissian, H., Park, J., Tien, D., Wright, J. C., & Knobe, J. (2011). Folk moral 
relativism. Mind & Language, 26(4), 482-505. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, 
osf.io/cy4b6/) 
*2012 
Most cited: Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Reflection and reasoning in moral 
judgment. Cognitive Science, 36(1), 163-177. [Study 1] (Context-based, unsuccessful, 
osf.io/ejmyw/) 
Random 1: Schaffer, J., & Knobe, J. (2012). Contrastive knowledge surveyed. Noûs, 46(4), 675-
708. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/z4e45/) 
Random 2: May, J., & Holton, R. (2012). What in the world is weakness of will? Philosophical 
Studies, 157(3), 341-360. [Study 3] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/s37h6/) 
*2013 
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Most cited: Nagel, J., San Juan, V., & Mar, R. A. (2013). Lay denial of knowledge for justified 
true beliefs. Cognition, 129(3), 652-661. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/6yfxz/) 
Random 1: Beebe, J. R., & Shea, J. (2013). Gettierized Knobe effects. Episteme, 10(3), 219. 
(Content-based, successful, osf.io/k89fc/) 
Random 2: Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The lesson of bypassing. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 4(4), 599-619. [Study 1] (Content-based, null effect, successful, osf.io/ggw7c/) 
*2014 
Most cited: Murray, D., & Nahmias, E. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 434-467. [Study 1] (Content-based, 
successful, osf.io/rpkjk/) 
Random 1: Grau, C., & Pury, C. L. (2014). Attitudes towards reference and replaceability. 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(2), 155-168. (Demographic effect, unsuccessful, 
osf.io/xrhqe/) 
Random 2: Liao, S., Strohminger, N., & Sripada, C. S. (2014). Empirically investigating 
imaginative resistance. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 54(3), 339-355. [Study 2] (Content-
based, successful, osf.io/7e8hz/) 
*2015 
Most cited: Buckwalter, W., & Schaffer, J. (2015). Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes. Noûs, 
49(2), 201-234. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/2ukpq/) 
Random 1: Björnsson, G., Eriksson, J., Strandberg, C., Olinder, R. F., & Björklund, F. (2015). 
Motivational internalism and folk intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 28(5), 715-734. [Study 
2] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/d8uvg/) 
Random 2: Kominsky, J. F., Phillips, J., Gerstenberg, T., Lagnado, D., & Knobe, J. (2015). 
Causal superseding. Cognition, 137, 196-209. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, 
osf.io/f5svw/) 
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Appendix 2. Pre-replication form 
 
Reference of the paper: … 
Replication team: … 
 
*Which study in the paper do you replicate? … 
*If it is not the first study, please explain your choice: … 
*In this study, what is the main result you will focus on during replication? Please give all relevant 
statistical details present in the paper: … 
*What is the corresponding hypothesis? ... 
*What is the corresponding effect size? … 
*Was the original effect size: 
 Explicitly reported in the original paper 
 Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information present in the 
original paper 
 Not inferable from information present in the original paper. 
*What is the corresponding confidence interval (if applicable)? 
*Was the original confidence interval: 
 Explicitly reported in the original paper 
 Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information present in the 
original paper 
 Not inferable from information present in the original paper. 
*From which population was the sample used in the original study drawn? (Which country, language, 
students/non-students, etc.) 
*Was the nature of the original population: 
 Explicitly reported in the original paper 
47 
 
 Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information present in the 
original paper 
 Not inferable from information present in the original paper. 
*What was the original sample size (N): … 
*Was the original sample size: 
 Explicitly reported in the original paper 
 Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information present in the 
original paper 
 Not inferable from information present in the original paper. 
*Does the study involve a selection procedure (e.g. comprehension checks)? (YES/NO) 
*If YES, describe it briefly: … 
*Were all the steps of the selection procedure (including, e.g., comprehension checks): 
 Explicitly reported in the original paper 
 Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information present in the 
original paper 
 Not inferable from information present in the original paper. 
*Overall, would you say that the original paper contained all the information necessary to properly 
conduct the replication (YES/NO) 
*If NO, explain what information was lacking: ... 
 
Power analysis and required sample size: 
(Please, describe briefly the power analysis you conducted to determine the minimum required sample 
size. If the original effect is a null effect, just describe the required sample size you obtained by doubling 
the original sample size.) 
 
Projected sample size: 
(Please, describe the actual sample size you plan to use in the replication.) 
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Appendix 3. Post-replication form  
 
Reference of the paper: … 
Replication team: … 
 
Methods 
Power analysis and required sample size: 
(Please, describe briefly the power analysis you conducted to determine the minimum required sample 
size. If the original effect is a null effect, just describe the required sample size you obtained by doubling 
the original sample size.) 
Actual sample size and population: 
(Describe the number of participants you actually recruited, and the nature of the population they are 
drawn from. Indicate whether the number of participants you actually recruited matched the one you 
planned on the OSF pre-registration. Describe briefly any difference between the population you drew 
your sample from and the population the original study drew its sample from.) 
Materials and Procedure: 
(Describe the procedure you employed for the replication, like you would in the Methods section of a 
paper. At the end, indicate all important differences between the original study and replication, e.g. 
language, ) 
 
Results 
Data analysis - Target effect: 
(Focusing on the effect you singled out as the target effect for replication, describe the results you 
obtained. Then describe the statistical analyses you performed, detailing the effect size, the significance 
of the effect and, when applicable, the confidence interval.) 
Data analysis - Other effects: 
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(If the original study included other effects and you performed the corresponding analyses, please, 
describe them in this section.) 
Data analysis - Exploratory Analysis: 
(If you conducted additional analyses that were absent from the original study, feel free to report them 
here. Just indicate whether they were planned in the OSF pre-registration, or exploratory.) 
 
Discussion 
Success assessment: 
(Did you succeed in replicating the original result? If applicable, does the original team agree with you?) 
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